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INTRODUCTION
Next to Texas, no state has executed more capital defendants
than Virginia, eighty-seven as of February 11, 2003.' Moreover,
once the state obtains a death sentence in Virginia, not only is it
likely that the sentence will survive appellate review and the
defendant will be executed, but the wait between imposition of
sentence and execution is likely to be unusually short.2 This resolve
in carrying out the death sentences it imposes, and carrying them
out swiftly, has earned Virginia a reputation as one of the nation's
"worst" death penalty states, second only perhaps to Texas.
The fact that Virginia carries out more of the death sentences it
imposes than does any other state, and the fact that it does so with
such dispatch, tells us something about the conduct of prosecutors
and appellate courts. For although Virginia prosecutors do not
obtain the death penalty as often as prosecutors in a number of
otherjurisdictions,4 they do manage to secure the execution of those
sentences they do obtain, due in no small part to the fact that the
1. Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions By State Since 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgdpicreg.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003). As of February 11,
2003, Texas had executed 297 inmates. Id.
2. See Stephen J. Spurr, The Future of Capital Punishment: Determinants of the Time
from Death Sentence to Execution 17 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
authors) ("There is wide variation across states that have the death penalty, with respect to
both the likelihood of execution and waiting time. The state that is unquestionably the most
severe in both dimensions is Virginia."); see also Brooke A. Masters, A Rush on Virginia's
Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2000, at A10 ("[Tihe average time between sentencing and
death in Virginia has dropped 40 percent since 1995, to six years-more than four years
faster than the national average.").
3. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error
in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It 73 tbl.6 (Feb. 11, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
4. See John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and
Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 486 tbl.2 (1999); Liebman et al.,
supra note 3, at 344 tbl.18 (ranking Virginia twenty-ninth out of thirty-four states in terms
of the rate per 1000 homicides at which it imposes death sentences). One possible
explanation for the comparatively low rate at which Virginia prosecutors secure the death
penalty relative to the number of homicides in the state may be Virginia's so-called
"triggerman rule," under which "only the actual perpetrator of crime ... [defined as capital
murder] may be convicted of capital murder and subjected to the penalty of execution, except
in the case of murder for hire." Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 (Va. 1986).
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Virginia Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, for all practical purposes the courts of last
resort for death-row inmates in Virginia, rarely grant relief in
capital cases. 5
But what happens before a case enters the stream of appellate
review, when jurors, not prosecutors and appellate judges, are
among the critical actors? How do jurors who sit on capital cases in
Virginia think and behave? Do they act any differently than capital
jurors in other states?
We approach these questions through an analysis of data
gathered from interviews with jurors who served on Virginia capital
cases. After a brief description of the data, we explore four areas of
interest: how Virginia capital jurors feel about the death penalty in
general; how well they understand the legal rules designed to guide
their sentencing decision; how, if at all, their beliefs about the
defendant's future dangerousness influence their deliberations and
sentencing decision; and how they allocate responsibility for the
defendant's fate, as between themselves and other legal actors, and
as between themselves and the defendant.
Our collection of data from capital jurors in Virginia reflects a
continuation of the work of the Capital Jury Project (CJP), a
nationwide effort to systematically gather and analyze data on the
5. According to a recent report from the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission
of the Virginia General Assembly, the Virginia Supreme Court granted relief on direct appeal
in only eight percent of the 156 capital cases reviewed between 1977 and 2001, and it granted
relief in only one of the fifty-six cases reviewed in state habeas corpus proceedings after 1995.
See Joint Legislative Audit & Review Commission of the Virginia General Assembly, Review
of Virginia's System of Capital Punishment 58 fig.20, 59 fig.21 (Jan. 15, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors) thereinafter Assembly Review].
Similarly, of the 111 Virginia capital cases reviewed in federal district courts between 1977
and 2001, the courts granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in only fifteen; moreover,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of the petition
in only two of those fifteen cases. It reversed in the remaining thirteen. See Assembly
Review, supra, at 60 fig.22. According to Liebman and his colleagues, four federal
circuits-the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh--decided eighty-eight percent of all capital
cases between 1973 and 1995. Of those four circuits, the Fourth Circuit had the lowest
reversal rates associated with its review of cases from North Carolina, South Carolina, and
especially, Virginia. See Liebman et al., supra note 3, at 126 fig.15; cf Roger Parloff, The
Voodoo Court, 22 AM. LAW. 15 (2000) ("When it comes to death penalty jurisprudence, the
Fourth Circuit has quietly seceded from the Union.").
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behavior of capital sentencing jurors.6 The CJP began interviewing
jurors in a number of states in 1990, and analyses of CJP data
began appearing soon thereafter.7 Much of the published research
6. The nationwide CJP database, not yet publically available, contains the results of
interviews with 1155 jurors who served on 340 capital cases in fourteen states. See Ursula
Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death; Guilt is Overwhelming;
Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK L. REV. 1011, 1065
n.192 (2001) (reporting the collection of data in Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale,
Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IN. L.J. 1043, 1078 nn.190-94 (1995).
7. Quantitative analyses of CJP data appear in John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen P. Garvey, Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S
DEATH PENALTY 144 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2002) (multistate data); Bentele & Bowers,
supra note 6, at 1065 (addendum) (multistate data); Bowers, supra note 6, at 1085
(multistate data); William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Jurors'Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1476 (1998) (multistate data); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By
Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77
TEX. L. REV. 605 (1998) (multistate data); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin
T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELLL. REV.
1599 (1998) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Remorse] (South Carolina data); Theodore
Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race,
Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (2001) [hereinafter
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey
& Martin T. Wells, Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 339 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Responsibility] (South Carolina data);
Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, The Deadly Paradox of Capital
Jurors, 74 8. CAL. L. REV. 371 (2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Deadly Paradox] (South
Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Victim
Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 306 (2003) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly
Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993) (South Carolina
data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 CoLuM. L. REV. 1538 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation]
(South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter Garvey, Emotional Economy] (South Carolina data);
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or
Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995) (North Carolina data); Marla Sandys, Cross-
Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for
Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (Kentucky data); Scott E. Sundby, The
Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death
Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998) [hereinafter Sundby, Absolution] (California data);
Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy
Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003) (California data); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as
Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1109 (1997) (California data).
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using CJP data has been based on interviews with jurors from
South Carolina, the state with the largest number of interviews
among those states included in the CJP. Because we have access to
the South Carolina data, and because South Carolina and Virginia
are southern states, both of which quickly reinstated the death
penalty following the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia,' we present our results from Virginia alongside updated
results from South Carolina in order to provide some basis for
comparison.
Overall, we find, albeit based on a very limited sample size, that
the jurors we were able to interview in Virginia tend to think and
act, for both good and bad, in much the same way as do jurors in
South Carolina. If Virginia jurors are distinctive in any respect, it's
in the attention they devote to considerations relating to the
defendant's future dangerousness. South Carolina jurors are
preoccupied with the defendant's future dangerousness when they
deliberate about his fate, but Virginia jurors are, if anything, even
more preoccupied.
I. COLLECTING THE DATA
Law students at William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of
Law conducted all but one of the Virginia juror interviews. Each
interview, conducted during the fall and winter of 2001, lasted on
average between three and four hours, and used a slightly expanded
version of the original CJP interview instrument.9 The instrument
covered both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and included
questions about the crime, the defendant, the victim, the victim's
family, the jury's deliberations, and the conduct of the trial by the
judge and lawyers. The instrument also collected basic demographic
Qualitative analyses of CJP data can be found in Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's The
Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J.
1137 (1995) (Indiana data); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in
Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995) (Georgia data).
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
9. The modified questionnaire included several additional questions related to future
dangerousness and victim impact evidence.
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and attitudinal information from each juror. In the end the
instrument yielded data on over 750 variables.
In keeping with CJP guidelines, our goal at the outset was to
conduct interviews evenly divided between cases ending in a
sentence of death and those ending in a sentence of life im-
prisonment. 10 We limited our pool of cases to those tried before 1997
in an effort to avoid interfering with ongoing litigation. We had
hoped to gather enough data to permit the use of regression
analysis to isolate those factors that best predict when Virginia
jurors vote for life and when they vote for death. Unfortunately,
jurors who sat on cases tried before 1997 turned out to be
exceptionally difficult to locate and interview. Some jurors had
moved from the locale where the trial had originally been conducted
and could not be located; others simply refused to be interviewed,
or were disinclined to spend the time needed to complete the entire
survey.
In the end, we were able to conduct in-depth interviews with
sixteen jurors, each of whom served on a case involving one of six
defendants. Table 1 presents a profile of each defendant. In the case
of defendant number 4, one of the jurors served on the original trial
and sentencing, which was held in 1993. The other two jurors
served at a resentencing hearing, which was held in 1996 after the
defendant's original sentence had been reversed on appeal. All told,
twelve jurors sat on cases resulting in a sentence of death, and four
sat on cases resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment. Cases
resulting in death are therefore over-represented in our sample.
Three of the four defendants sentenced to death were executed in
2000, and one in 2002. The defendants in four of the cases were
black; those in the remaining two were white.
10. See Bowers, supra note 6, at 1081.
2068 [Vol. 44:2063
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Table 1
Defendant Year of Sentence Year of Defendant Number of
Number Trial Execution race jurors
interviewed
#1 1995 Death 2000 Black 3
#2 1995 Death 2000 White 3
#3 1995 Death 2000 White 3
#4 1993 Death 2002 Black 1
#4 1996 Death 2002 Black 2
#5 1991 Life - Black 2
#6 1996 Life - Black 2
At this point we should enter three important caveats about the
analysis that follows and any conclusion that may be drawn from
the data.
First, our data are based on juror self-reports: our understanding
of the facts and circumstances of the cases on which the jurors sat
is therefore based entirely on what the jurors told us. We did not
undertake any independent substantive review of the case files.
Data based on self-reporting are subject to a variety of limitations,"
not least of which is the risk of memory decay. The jurors we
interviewed were asked about an event, albeit one likely to leave a
lasting impression, 2 that happened several years ago.
Second, because the number of jurors we were able to interview
was limited, our ability to confidently generalize is likewise limited.
11. For a more detailed discussion of these limitations, see, for example, Garvey,
Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 7, at 1541-42; Garvey, Emotional Economy, supra
note 7, at 29-30.
12. Keeping in mind the limits of self-reports, twelve of fourteen jurors nonetheless said
they remembered hearing evidence about the defendant's punishment "very welln " or "fairly
well," and thirteen of fourteen said they remembered the jury deliberations about the
defendant's punishment "very well" or "fairly well."
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Our small sample of Virginia jurors diminishes the power of our
statistical tests to detect significant differences." Although most of
the differences we report between Virginia and South Carolina
jurors are statistically insignificant, we cannot rule out the
possibility that our small sample of Virginia jurors has caused us
to miss real differences that may nonetheless exist between the two
groups. Additional interviews could very well yield different results.
Third, although we will speak throughout about "Virginia"jurors,
we hasten to emphasize that with one exception all of the jurors we
interviewed were from what is known as the Tidewater region of
Virginia. Insofar as Virginia citizens of the Tidewater region hold
beliefs and attitudes uncharacteristic of the population of the state
as a whole, our ability to generalize from our results is again
limited. In this connection, we would note that some observers of
Virginia politics maintain that the Tidewater region is generally
less "liberal" than Northern Virginia, but more "liberal" than
Western Virginia.14 Whether these differences in basic political
orientation, assuming they exist, spill over into the sentencing
behavior of capital juries is, of course, another question altogether.
II. GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY
We begin with a series of questions the CJP instrument asked of
jurors that were designed to probe their general attitudes toward
the death penalty: Do you support or oppose it? What are your
beliefs about the way in which it is administered? Would you prefer
an alternative to it?
First, any prospective capital juror can be challenged and
removed for cause during voir dire if she would vote against the
death penalty as a matter of conscience in every case in which the
state requested it," or if she would vote for the death penalty as a
13. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ, PRIMER OF BIOSTATISTICS ch. 6 (5th ed. 2002)
(discussing the relationship between sample size and analytical power of statistical tests).
14. This is a common comment one hears from both prosecuting and defense attorneys.
15. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) ("[A] sentence of death cannot
be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding
veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or
expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."); accord Wainwright v.
2070 [Vol. 44:2063
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matter of principle in any case for which it was authorized by law.'
Capital jurors are therefore both "death-qualified" and "life-
qualified." As a result of the latter process, no prospective capital
juror should be allowed to serve if he or she believes that death is
the only acceptable punishment for a defendant convicted of
murder. Keeping this in mind, consider the results in Table 2,
which show how our jurors responded when asked how they
currently felt regarding the propriety of the death penalty for
someone convicted of murder. The responses of capital jurors from
South Carolina are given for purposes of comparison.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
16. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,729 (1992) ("Ajuror who will automatically vote
for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.").
20031 2071
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Ten out of the twelve jurors who responded (eighty-three percent)
said that the death penalty was either the most appropriate
punishment or just one of several appropriate punishments. One
juror said the death penalty was the least appropriate punishment.
None of these responses is inconsistent with service on a capital
jury. One juror, however, said death was the only acceptable
punishment. Assuming that this juror held the same belief at the
time of trial, 17 the juror should have been disqualified. This pattern
of responses is similar to that revealed in the responses of jurors
17. Although a substantial period of time elapsed between the time the Virginia jurors
served and the time they were interviewed, some support exists for the assumption that a
juror's general attitude toward the death penalty is unlikely to have changed between the
time of trial and the time of interview insofar as attitudes toward the death penalty tend to
be "basically emotional.* Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross,Hardening oftheAttitudes:
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19, 26 (1994). Furthermore, it has
been suggested that such attitudes are "an aspect of self-identification." Samuel R. Gross,
Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1448, 1452 (1998). Moreover, four of thirteen Virginia jurors who responded to the
question, "Have your personal feelings about the death penalty changed as a result of serving
on the [defendant's] case?," indicated that the experience left them more opposed to the death
penalty than before. The other nine jurors indicated that the experience did not change their
feelings.
Table 2
For convicted murderers, do you now feel that the
death penalty is...
Virginia South
(n = 12) Carolina
(n = 212)
The only acceptable punishment 8% 13%
The most appropriate punishment 25% 30%
Just one of several appropriate 58% 54%
punishments _
The least appropriate punishment 8% 1%
An unacceptable punishment 0% 2%
Note - The significance level for the differences between the Virginia and
South Carolina jurors is p - 0.442 based on a Mann-Whitney test.
2072 [Vol. 44:2063
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from South Carolina, 8 supplements existing data which suggest
that a troubling number ofjurors whose pro-death attitudes should
disqualify them from serving on a capital jury are being allowed to
serve nonetheless.
We next explore the attitudes of our Virginia jurors across a
range of statements relating to the death penalty, once again
placing them in comparison to the attitudes expressed by their
South Carolina counterparts. The CJP questionnaire presented
jurors with a number of propositions and asked them how strongly
they agreed or disagreed with the stated proposition. The results
presented here were recoded on a scale ranging from 1 to 3, with 1
expressing strong or moderate agreement, 2 expressing slight
agreement or disagreement, and 3 expressing strong or moderate
disagreement. The mean responses are presented in Table 3.
18. Prior CJP research on South Carolina jurors has found that some fourteen percent
said they felt the death penalty was the "only acceptable" punishment for "convicted
murderers." See Eisenberg et al., Deadly Paradox, supra note 7, at 382-83 n.47. This
percentage increases when the crime or the defendant is described in more detail, as for
example, when the crime is described as the killing of a police officer. See Blume et al., supra
note 7, at 344 tbl.1; Bowers et al., supra note 7, at 1505 tbl.6.
207320031
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2063
Table 3
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about
punishment for convicted murderers?
1-strongly or moderately agree; 2-slightly agree or disagree;
3-strongly or moderately disagree
(means)
Virginia South p-value
Carolina
You wish we had a better way than the death 1.31 1.27 0.735
penalty of stopping murderers
The death penalty is too arbitrary because 1.46 1.22 0.140
some people are executed while others serve
prison terms for the same crimes
If the death penalty were enforced more often 1.55 1.45 0.278
there would be fewer murders in this country
Even convicted murderers should not be 2.17 1.92 0.302
denied hope of parole some day, if they make
a real effort to pay for their crimes
Murderers owe something more than life in 1.30 1.30 0.919
prison to society and especially to their
victim's families
Defendants who can afford good lawyers 1.42 1.62 0.461
almost never get a death sentence
The death penalty should be required when 1.92 1.46 0.027
someone is convicted of a serious intentional
murder
You have moral doubts about the death 2.07 1.93 0.466
penalty
Persons sentenced to prison for murder in this 1.14 1.36 0.409
state are back on the streets far too soon
Note - With the exception of the last item in the list, the number of Virginia jurors ranged from
10 to 13. Only seven Virginia jurors responded to the last item. The number of South Carolina
jurors ranged from 183 to 205. Significance levels for the differences between the Virginia and
South Carolina jurors are based on a Mann-Whitney test.
With one exception, none of the results presented in Table 3
rises to the level of statistical significance. If any differences do
exist between the attitudes of Virginia and South Carolina jurors,
we have been unable to detect them. The exception involves the
statement, "The death penalty should be required when someone is
convicted of a serious intentional murder." On a scale ranging from
1 to 3, with 1 indicating agreement and 3 indicating disagreement,
2074
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the mean response among the South Carolina jurors was 1.46, while
that among the Virginia jurors was 1.92. The difference between
the two groups is statistically significant atp = 0.027. 9 This result
suggests at least one dimension along which Virginia jurors, or at
least those from the Tidewater region, may be slightly more liberal
than their South Carolina counterparts. Again, however, our small
sample of Virginia jurors counsels caution in drawing any firm
conclusions.
Finally, we explore whether the jurors would, if given the choice,
prefer a punishment other than death for those convicted of
murder. A number of public opinion polls have found that, when
respondents are asked about alternatives to the death penalty, and
in particular whether they would prefer a specified alternative to
the death penalty if that alternative were available, support for the
death penalty tends to drop.2 ° For example, in a June 2002 Gallup
poll, seventy-two percent of the respondents said they favored the
death penalty when asked simply, "Are you in favor of the death
penalty for a person convicted of murder?"21 In contrast, when
19. We also calculated the p-values for the items listed in Table 3 using survey ordered
logit regression in order to account for the fact that not all juror responses are independent
of one another insofar as more than one interviewed juror sat on each case. The differences
between the Virginia and South Carolina jurors with respect to their reactions to the
statement, "The death penalty should be required when someone is convicted of a serious
intentional murder" remained significant at p = 0.005. All other differences remained
insignificant, with the exception of the responses to the statement, "The death penalty is too
arbitrary because some people are executed while others serve prison terms for the same
offense," which reaches significance at p = 0.070. This statistically significant difference,
unlike the previous one, suggests a dimension along which the Virginia jurors we
interviewed may be more conservative than their South Carolina counterparts.
20. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital
Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77, 79-80 (1994)
(describing polls); Gross, supra note 17, at 1455-56 & tbl. 1 (describing Gallup polls).
21. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Say Death Penalty Applied Fairly:
Support for the Death Penalty Higher Than in Recent Years, at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/releases/pr020520.asp (last visited Mar. 24,2003). Support for the death penalty declined
between 1996 and 2000 from record high levels in the immediately preceding years. See, e.g.,
Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views on the Death
Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 7, 7
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2002). The seventy-two percent figure reported in the text for 2002
reflects a slight increase over the 1996-2000 period low.
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asked, "If you could choose between the following two approaches,
which do you think is the better penalty for murder-the death
penalty or life imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of
parole?," only fifty-two percent said the death penalty.
22
Prior CJP research has found that support for the death
penalty tends to drop in a parallel fashion among capital jurors
who are asked a similar question.2" Table 4 gives the responses of
our Virginia jurors when asked about three alternatives to the
death penalty, comparing them once again to jurors from South
Carolina.24
The two groups are quite similar. Few jurors from either state
are prepared to say they prefer imprisonment with parole eligi-
bility after twenty-five years to the death penalty, even if the
defendant is also required to earn money to pay restitution to
the victims' family. On the other hand, half of the Virginia jurors
said they would prefer life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole, and almost sixty percent say they would prefer life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it were coupled
with a requirement of restitution. Although South Carolina jurors
might be somewhat more willing to abandon their support for the
death penalty than are Virginia jurors, 25 none of the differences
between the two groups is statistically significant.
22. See Jones, supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Deadly Pardox, supra note 7, at 391 & tbl6 (reporting
similar prior results based on interviews with South Carolina jurors).
24. The results reported in Table 4 for the South Carolina jurors are very similar to those
previously reported in Eisenberg, et al., Deadly Paradox, supra note 391 & tbl.6.
25. Twenty percent of the South Carolina jurors, compared to only 9% of the Virginia
jurors, preferred the option of twenty-five years with parole plus restitution, and 70% of the
South Carolina jurors, compared to only 58% of the Virginia jurors, preferred the option of
no parole plus restitution.
2076 [Vol. 44:2063
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Table 4
Would you prefer the following alternatives?
Virginia South p-value
Carolina
Yes No Yes No
If murderers in this state could be sentenced 9% 91% 20% 80% 0.694
to life in prison with no chance of parole for
twenty-five years and even then be eligible
for parole only if they earned and paid a
required amount of money to the families
of their victims, would you prefer this as
an alternative to the death penalty?
If murderers in this state could be sentenced 50% 50% 50% 50% 0.999
to life in prison without the possibility of
ever being released on parole, would you
prefer this as an alternative to the death
penalty?
If murderers in this state could be sentenced 58% 42% 70% 30% 0.519
to life with absolutely no chance of parole
and also required to work in prison for
money that would go to the victims'
families, would you prefer this as an
alternative to the death penalty?
Note- The number of Virginia jurors ranged from 11 to 12; the number of South Carolina jurors
ranged from 171 to 186. Significance levels for the differences between the Virginia and South
Carolina jurors are based on Fisher's exact.
III. CONFUSION
The CJP interview instrument asked a number of questions
designed to test how well jurors understood the law governing their
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and whether
they were required under certain circumstances to impose a death
sentence. Many jurors, it turns out, seem confused about the law
governing their decision. Indeed, confusion over the law is a central
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theme to emerge from much of the work of the CJP.2  Are Virginia
jurors similarly confused?
We begin with a brief review of the law governing a capital jury's
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. Broadly
speaking, a state can make any fact or circumstance an aggravating
factor provided the factor "genuinely narrow [s] the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and ... reasonably justif[ies] the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder."27 Moreover, no constitutional bar
prevents a state from introducing aggravating facts that do not fall
within the scope of a statutory aggravating factor, provided the
state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least
one such factor.28 The law governing aggravating factors is thus
largely a matter of state law.
Mitigating factors are different. Here the Constitution preempts
the field. While each state is free to decide for itself whether to
allow capital jurors the freedom to consider nonstatutory aggra-
vating evidence, the Constitution requires states to allow each
capital juror the freedom to consider any and all evidence in
mitigation, statutory or nonstatutory. Known as the Lockett
doctrine after the name of the case from which it derives,29 the
doctrine prevents the state from erecting any legal barrier to a
capital defendant's freedom to present mitigating evidence, or to a
capital juror's freedom to consider it. In particular, a capital juror
must be free to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence as well
as statutory evidence; a capital juror must be free to consider
evidence in mitigation even if the defense has not proven its
existence beyond a reasonable doubt; and a capital juror must be
26. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 7, at 349-65 tbls.3-6; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note
7, at 9-12 tbls.3-4; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 7, at 1165-66 tbl.1.
27. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
28. See id. at 878; accord Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 954 (1983).
29. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). The Court concluded that
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted).
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free to consider evidence in mitigation even if the jury as a whole
does not unanimously agree on its existence.
In many states a capital defendant enters the penalty phase
after being convicted of murder and becomes constitutionally
eligible for the death penalty once the jury finds the existence of at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance during the penalty
phase. In other states, aggravating factors are incorporated into
the definition of capital murder, and a defendant's membership
in the death-eligible class is determined at the guilt phase, not
the penalty phase. Virginia is generally understood to fall into this
second group.30 Virginia law defines capital murder as a "willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing" plus the existence of an
additional factor, such as the killing of a "law-enforcement officer."3
Although many states would treat this additional factor as an
aggravating circumstance to be found at the penalty phase, Virginia
treats it as an element of the offense of capital murder to be found
at the guilt phase.
Once a Virginia capital defendant enters the penalty phase, the
jury's sentencing decision is structured in a way unlike that of
almost all other states. In many states, if not most, the jury is
instructed to arrive at a sentence, life imprisonment or death, by
weighing aggravating factors against mitigating ones. 2 In Virginia,
the jury's deliberations are more narrowly focused. The jury is
instructed that it may not impose a sentence of death unless, in the
language of the applicable statute:
after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of
the defendant, [it] find[s] that there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his
conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged
30. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Capital Murder From Benefit of Clergy to
Bifurcated Trials: Narrowing the Class of Offenses Punishable by Death, 29 CRIM. L. BULL.
291, 300 & n.35 (1993).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(6) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2002).
32. See generally James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The
Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 33-52 (1995)
(discussing this scheme).
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was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim .. .
The attention of a capital jury in Virginia is therefore directed
toward two considerations: the future dangerousness of the
defendant and the vileness of the crime.34 The jury is also free, as
Lockett requires, to consider all evidence in mitigation.35 However,
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that Lockett does not
go so far as to require Virginia to instruct jurors on the specific
mitigating factors relevant to the case, even when those factors
are expressly described as mitigating in the state's capital
sentencing statute.3 6 In fact, Virginia's model jury instructions
merely direct the jury to base its decision on "all the evidence." The
term "mitigation" is nowhere mentioned."
In light of this legal structure, we next examine how well Virginia
jurors understand the rules governing aggravating and mitigating
factors.
A. Aggravating Factors
The CJP interview instrument asked three basic questions
regarding the law governing aggravating factors: (1) Could the jury
consider only statutory aggravating factors ("Only a specific list of
aggravating factors mentioned by the judge"), or could it consider
nonstatutory factors or evidence as well ("Any aggravating factor
that made the crime worse")?; (2) Did an aggravating factor have to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the jury to
consider it?; and (3) Did the jurors have to agree unanimously that
an aggravating factor had been proven before they could consider
it?
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002).
34. See generally Douglass R. Banghart, Note, Vileness: Issues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF.
J. 77 (1999); Jason J. Solomon, Note, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 55 (1999).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002).
36. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998).
37. See id. at 273 n.1.
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The answers to these questions depend on the meaning assigned
to the terms "factor in favor of death" and "aggravating factor."
Jurors could have understood those terms to refer either to the
statutory aggravating factors of future dangerousness and vileness,
or in addition to nonstatutory aggravating factors not necessarily
related to either future dangerousness or vileness. Under Virginia
law: (1) A capital jury is free to consider nonstatutory aggravating
facts, but only if the state proves the existence of at least one of the
two statutory factors;38 (2) The state must prove at least one of the
two statutory factors beyond a reasonable doubt, but it need not
bear that burden with respect to nonstatutory aggravating facts; 39
and (3) The members of a capital jury must agree unanimously
that the state has proven the existence of at least one of the two
aggravating factors,40 but they need not reach unanimity on non-
statutory aggravating factors or evidence.
Table 5 reports the responses of our Virginia jurors. Given the
differences between Virginia and South Carolina law with respect
to aggravating circumstances, the opportunity to draw meaningful
comparisons between the two groups seemed limited. The
corresponding responses of South Carolina jurors are accordingly
omitted from the results presented in Table 5.
38. As a matter of Virginia practice, trial courts regularly allow the state to introduce
evidence in aggravation unrelated to either the future dangerousness or vileness factors,
provided the state has introduced evidence tending to prove the existence of at least one of
those factors. Telephone interview by Stephen P. Garvey with Robert E. Lee, Executive
Director, Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center (May 22, 2002).
39. See, e.g., Hoke v. Commonwealth, 377 S.E.2d 595, 602-03 (Va. 1989).
40. See id. Although the jury must unanimously find either future dangerousness or
vileness, they need not unanimously agree on the more specific predicates that support either
of those unanimous findings. See Banghart, supra note 34, at 98. For example, with respect
to the vileness factor, one juror might believe that a finding of vileness is supported by the
fact that the crime involved aggravated battery (but not depravity of mind), while another
might believe that such a finding is supported by the fact that the crime involved depravity
of mind (but not aggravated battery). Similarly, jurors need not unanimously agree on the
specific definition of "probability" underlying a unanimous judgment that "there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat to society."
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Table 5
Juror Comprehension of the Legal Rules Governing
Aggravating Factors
Virginia
Among the factors in favor of a death sentence, could the jury
consider...
Any aggravating factor that made the crime worse 42%
Only a specific list of aggravating factors mentioned by 8%
the judge
Don't know 50%
n = 12
For a factor in favor of a death sentence to be considered, did it
have to be...
Proved beyond a reasonable doubt 75%
Proved by a preponderance of the evidence 8%
Proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction 8%
Don't know 8%
n = 12
For a factor in favor of a death sentence to be considered, did
All jurors have to agree on that factor 50%
Jurors do not have to agree unanimously on that factor 25%
Don't know 25%
n = 12
The responses appear to reflect the ambiguity created when the
CJP questions are applied to Virginia's capital sentencing scheme.
Only with respect to the question relating to the burden of proof did
any single response command more than a majority of the jurors.
Nonetheless, if any pattern can be fairly discerned, it would appear
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to be that Virginia capital jurors, like South Carolina capital jurors,
generally tend to approach aggravating circumstances as if they
were elements of a substantive offense, whose existence the state
must therefore prove beyond a reasonable doubt and to the
satisfaction of every juror. 1 Moreover, insofar as the beyQnd-a-
reasonable-doubt burden of proof and the demand for jury
unanimity have become part of the folk wisdom about how criminal
trials over guilt and innocence are conducted, it makes sense that
jurors will carry those beliefs with them into the penalty phase,
which has the look and feel of a second trial. 4
2
B. Mitigating Factors
CJP analyses of jurors in other states, including South Carolina,
suggest that capital jurors generally understand that they can
consider mitigating circumstances beyond those expressly enu-
merated in statute. 3 Jurors generally understand that they are free
to consider any evidence in mitigation that the defendant wishes to
introduce. On the other hand, jurors also tend to believe that they
cannot consider a mitigating factor unless its existence is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt and to the satisfaction of every juror. 4
Yet, these latter two beliefs are plainly at odds with well-
established constitutional doctrine.
Are Virginia jurors any different? The results reported in Table
6 suggest not.
41. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 355 tbl.3; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 7, at 1165-
66 tbl. 1.
42. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 356; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 11.
43. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 360 tbl.4; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 7, at 1166
tbl.1.
44. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 360 tbl.4; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 7, at 1166
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Table 6
Juror Comprehension of the Legal Rules Governing
Mitigating Factors
Virginia South p-value
Carolina
Among the factors in favor of a life or lesser
sentence, could the jury consider...
Any mitigating factor that made the crime 44%* 49%* 0.432
not as bad
Only a specific list of mitigating factors 6% 16%
mentioned by the judge
Don't know 50% 35%
n = 16 n = 214
For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to
be considered, did it have to be ...
Proved beyond a reasonable doubt 44% 48% 0.143
Proved beyond a preponderance of the 13% 7%
evidence
Proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction 13%* 30%*
Don't know 31% 15%
n = 16 n = 214
For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to
be considered, did...
All jurors have to agree on that factor 44% 62% 0.070
Jurors do not have to agree unanimously on 19%* 24%*
that factor
Don't know 38% 14%
n = 16 n = 214
Note - An asterisk indicates the legally correct response. Significance levels for the differences
between the Virginia and South Carolina jurors are based on Fisher's exact.
2084 [Vol. 44:2063
VIRGINIA'S CAPITAL JURORS
Overall, the performance of our Virginia jurors does not inspire
great confidence. Only 44 percent understood that their consider-
ation of mitigating factors could extend to any fact or circumstance
the defendant proffered as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Only 13 percent understood that mitigating factors need only be
proven to ajuror's personal satisfaction. Forty-four percent wrongly
believed that mitigating factors had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Forty-four percent also wrongly believed that
mitigating factors could not be considered unless all jurors agreed
on that factor. Some of this misunderstanding may reflect problems
of recall. Still, Virginia jurors, like their counterparts in South
Carolina and elsewhere, appear to misunderstand some of the most
basic principles governing their consideration of evidence presented
in mitigation.
C. Mandatory Death
The Supreme Court has long held that under no circumstances
can a state mandate death as the punishment for a crime, no
matter how bad the crime or the defendant.45 Life imprisonment
must always remain a legally available option, and in fact, life im-
prisonment is always an option in Virginia, even if the jury believes
that aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, or even
if it believes no mitigating factors apply.
Nonetheless, a disturbing number of the jurors we interviewed
believed otherwise. We asked jurors two sets of questions with
particular relevance to Virginia's scheme of capital sentencing,
which focuses the jury's attention on the future dangerousness of
the defendant and the vileness of the crime. The first question in
each set asked if the juror believed the evidence proved the
existence of one or the other of these factors. The second question
asked if, after hearing the judge's instructions, the juror believed
45. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting
that mandatory death penalty schemes "treat(] all persons convicted of a designated offense
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.").
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the law required him or her to impose a death sentence if the
evidence proved the existence of one or the other of these factors.
Answers to the first question should vary depending on the facts
of the case on which the juror sat. But answers to the second
question should not vary. Only one answer is correct as a matter of
law: the law never requires a sentence of death.46 Table 7 gives the
responses.
Table 7
Vileness, Future Dangerousness and
Mandatory Capital Sentencing
Yes No n
Vileness
After hearing all the evidence, did you believe it 100% 0% 12
proved that the defendant's conduct was
heinous, vile, or depraved?
After hearing the judge's instructions, did you 55% 45% 11
believe that the law required you to impose a
death sentence if the evidence proved that the
defendant's conduct was heinous, vile, or
depraved?
Future Dangerousness
After hearing all the evidence, did you believe it 92% 8% 13
proved that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future?
After hearing the judge's instructions, did you 46% 53% 13
believe that the law required you to impose a
death sentence if the evidence proved that the
defendant would be dangerous in the future?
46. See id.
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All of the jurors who responded believed that the evidence proved
the defendant's conduct was heinous, vile or depraved, and all but
one said the evidence proved the defendant would be dangerous
in the future. Given that twelve out of the sixteen jurors we
interviewed served on cases in which the jury ultimately voted to
return a sentence of death, these results come as little surprise.
What does come as a surprise, however, is the number of jurors
who, given a finding of future dangerousness or vileness, believed
that the law required them to return a death sentence. More than
half the jurors in the case of vileness, and just less than half in the
case of future dangerousness, reported holding such a belief.
These results are generally consistent with those from South
Carolina. They are also consistent with the results of a mock jury
study we conducted in the spring of 2000 with more than 150
subjects recruited from Williamsburg and Newport News, Virginia,
and instructed using the standard instructions given to Virginia
jurors in capital cases.47 Table 8 compares the responses of our
jurors to the second question in each set with those of jurors from
these two groups.
47. See Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Paul Marcus, Correcting Deadly
Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 638 n.41
(2000).
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Table 8
Mandatory Capital Sentencing
Virginia CJP Jurors, Virginia Mock Jurors,
and South Carolina CJP Jurors
After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that
the law required you to impose a death sentence if the
evidence proved that the defendant's conduct was heinous,
vile, or depraved?
Yes No n p-value
Virginia CJP Jurors 55% 45% 11
Virginia Mock Jurors 41% 59% 154 0.529
South Carolina CJP 36% 63% 206 0.337
Jurors
After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that
the law required you to impose a death sentence if the
evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous in
the future?
Yes No n p-value
Virginia CJP Jurors 46% 53% 13
Virginia Mock Jurors 38% 62% 154 0.570
South Carolina CJP 30% 70% 206 0.224
Jurors
Note - Significance levels for the differences between the Virginia
CJP jurors and the Virginia mock jurors are based on Fisher's exact.
The significance levels for the Virginia CJP jurors and the South
Carolina CJP jurors are also based on Fisher's exact.
The level of misunderstanding is higher among both sets of
Virginia jurors than among South Carolina jurors. As between the
two sets of Virginia jurors the level of misunderstanding is higher
among the CJP jurors than among the mock jurors. The differences
between the Virginia CJP jurors and the mock Virginia jurors may
of course be due to recall problems attributable to the lag between
the time the CJP jurors were instructed on the law and the
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time they were interviewed. These differences are, in any event,
statistically insignificant. But even if the level of misunderstanding
among the mock jurors is closer to the true level of misunder-
standing among Virginia jurors, that figure alone suggests that far
too many believe they are required to impose a death when in fact
they are not.
What's worse, this misunderstanding appears due at least in
part to confusion generated by the standard jury instructions
used in Virginia capital cases. In the previously mentioned mock
jury study, we found that 49% of the jurors who received the
standard instruction believed they were required to impose a death
sentence if they thought the defendant's crime was heinous, and
45% believed they were required to impose a death sentence if
they thought the defendant would be dangerous in the future. In
contrast, the corresponding figures for jurors who received a
clarifying instruction were only 29% and 24% respectively.48 The
confusion about mandatory death among Virginia jurors is thus
needless confusion. Simple changes to Virginia's standard jury
instructions could significantly reduce the problem.
IV. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
Prior CJP research has shown that worries about a capital
defendant's future dangerousness influence the dynamics of the
penalty phase of a capital trial in at least three ways.
A. Discussion Among Jurors
First, the discussion among jurors during the penalty phase
tends to focus heavily on the risk that the defendant, if not
sentenced to death, will be released back into society to do more
harm.49 Virginia jurors likewise tend to focus heavily on the
defendant's future dangerousness. Indeed, Virginia jurors seem to
48. See id. at 640 tbl.3.
49. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 5-6 tbl.1.
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focus more on future dangerousness, at least when compared to
South Carolina jurors.
The CJP interview instrument presented jurors with a lengthy
list of topics on which their penalty-phase deliberations might have
focused. Jurors were asked how much the jury's discussion focused
on each topic. Responses ranged from a "great deal" (coded 1)
to "not at all" (coded 4). Table 9 presents the mean responses for
both Virginia jurors and South Carolina jurors. Topics related to
future dangerousness are listed first. The remaining topics follow,
arranged from those most discussed among Virginia jurors to those
least discussed.
Table 9
How much did the discussion among the jurors
focus on the following topics?
1-great deal 2-fair amount 3-not much 4-not at all
(mean responses)
Virginia South p-
Carolina values
Topics relating to future dangerousness
Defendant's dangerousness if ever back 1.33 1.98 0.020*
in society
How long before he would get a parole or pardon 1.42 2.28 0.076*
Need to prevent him from ever killing again 1.46 1.83 0.222
How likely he would be to get a parole or pardon 1.67 2.13 0.004*
Defendant's dangerousness to others in prison 3.42 3.38 0.576
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Topics relating to other considerations
Death penalty as what the defendant deserved 1.33 1.63 0.228
Defendant's role or responsibility in the crime 1.38 1.27 0.553
The way in which the victim was killed 1.46 1.40 0.746
How weak or strong the evidence of guilt was 1.54 1.50 0.928
Defendant's motive for the crime 1.62 1.60 0.902
Juror's own attitude toward capital punishment 1.67 2.05 0.255
Defendant's sorrow, remorse, or lack of it 1.77 2.01 0.335
Innocence or helplessness of the victim 1.77 1.75 0.708
How well the attorneys presented their cases 1.77 1.92 0.518
Defendant's planning or premeditation 1.85 1.63 0.495
What the law requires 1.85 1.77 0.749
Defendant's history of crime or violence 1.92 2.15 0.392
Pain or suffering of the victim before death 2.00 1.80 0.386
Defendant's background or upbringing 2.17 2.29 0.781
Defendant's appearance or manner in court 2.23 2.53 0.292
Loss or grief of victim's family 2.46 2.05 0.208
Jurors' feelings toward the defendant 2.58 2.38 0.387
Reputation or character of the victim 2.62 2.41 0.475
Death penalty as a deterrent to killings by others 2.67 2.83 0.676
Jurors' feelings for the family of the victim 2.67 2.42 0.381
The victim's role or responsibility in the crime 3.00 2.74 0.419
What moral values require 3.00 2.48 0.086*
Drugs as a factor in the crime 3.18 3.00 0.512
Defendant's IQ or intelligence 3.23 2.48 0.011*
What religious beliefs require 3.25 2.91 0.258
Alcohol as a factor in the crime 3.27 3.17 0.657
What community feelings require 3.31 3.10 0.376
Insanity as a factor in the crime 3.33 3.38 0.881
Jurors' feelings toward the defendant's family 3.33 2.73 0.029*
Punishment wanted by victim's family 3.42 3.00 0.176
Mental illness as a factor in the crime 3.50 3.05 0.106
Similarity to other crimes and other murders 3.62 3.42 0.574
Note - The number of Virginia jurors ranged from 11 to 13; the number of South Carolina jurors
ranged from 205 to 209. Significance levels for the differences between the Virginia and South
Carolinajurors are based on a Mann-Whitney test. Italics and an asterisk indicate ap-value less than
0.10.
The topic labeled "defendant's dangerousness if ever back in
society" is the topic most discussed among Virginia jurors at the
penalty phase, matched only by "death penalty as what the de-
fendant deserved." Other topics related to future dangerousness,
such as how long it might be before the defendant is either paroled
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or pardoned, were also among the topics most discussed. Jurors are
less concerned with the defendant's dangerousness when those at
peril are the defendant's fellow prison inmates.
Comparing the responses of Virginia jurors to those of South
Carolina jurors, the average Virginia juror tended to discuss topics
related to future dangerousness more than did the average South
Carolina juror (with the exception of defendant's dangerousness to
others in prison).5 o Moreover, the differences between the responses
of the Virginia and South Carolina jurors to three out of the five
topics related to future dangerousness were statistically significant.
One immediate explanation for these differences is the law. In
South Carolina, jurors are free to consider a defendant's future
dangerousness as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, but
future dangerousness is not among the aggravating factors
expressly enumerated in the state's capital sentencing statute. In
contrast, future dangerousness is expressly enumerated in Virginia
law. To be sure, future dangerousness is one of only two possible
predicates for a capital sentence in Virginia, and in some cases it
will constitute the only aggravating factor on which the prosecution
relies. Thus, Virginia jurors would tend to focus on future danger-
ousness because the law requires them to focus on it.
51
50. Virginia jurors also differed from South Carolina jurors with respect to a handful of
other items. For example, compared to the deliberations among South Carolina jurors, the
deliberations among Virginia jurors tended to concentrate less on "what moral values
require," "defendant's IQ or intelligence," and "jurors' feelings toward the defendant's family."
Assuming these differences are real, any explanation we could offer for them would be
speculation.
51. We also calculated p-values for the items listed in Table 9 using survey ordered logit
regression. See supra note 19. The differences between the responses of the Virginia jurors
and the South Carolina jurors were statistically significant for the following items:
"defendant's dangerousness if ever back in society" (p = 0.029); "how long before he would get
a pardon or parole" (p = 0.002); "death penalty as what the defendant deserved" (p = 0.093);
"defendant's IQ or intelligence" (p = 0.023); "juror's feelings toward the defendant's family"
(p = 0.004); and "punishment wanted by the victim's family" (p = 0.020). Two out of the three
topics related to future dangerousness and identified as statistically significant in Table 9
therefore retain their significance in the regression models.
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B. Estimates of Release Time
Second, the odds of a defendant causing future harm to others
outside of prison obviously depends on whether and when, if not
sentenced to death, he will be released from prison, usually on
parole. Prior CJP research has shown that capital jurors con-
sistently tend to underestimate the time a defendant would be
required to remain in prison before becoming parole-eligible.52 Is
the same true of Virginia jurors?
At the time the CJP began its interviews, many capital
defendants not sentenced to death would in fact have been eligible
for parole.53 The only real question was how long they would
remain in prison before reaching eligibility. Today, in contrast,
almost all states, including Virginia, provide that a capital defen-
dant sentenced to life imprisonment will remain in prison for the
rest of his life.54 Parole is no longer an option; life imprisonment
means imprisonment for life. In addition, a capital defendant is
now entitled, under Simmons v. South Carolina," to inform the
jury that he is ineligible for parole for life, provided he is in fact
ineligible for parole for life under state law and his future danger-
ousness is "at issue" at sentencing.56 Virginia law on this point
actually goes further than federal law. As of 1999, Virginia law
entitles all capital defendants to an instruction upon request that
"the words 'imprisonment for life'"-the only alternative to death
under Virginia law today-"mean 'imprisonment for life without
possibility of parole.' 57
52. See, e.g., Bowers & Steiner, supra note 7, at 647 tbl.1.
53. See id.
54. Death Penalty Information Center, Life Without Parole, at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/lwop.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
55. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
56. See id. at 156. For Simmons' progeny, see Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246
(2002); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156
(2000); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). For a critique of Simmons' "at issue"
requirement, see John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Future
Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2001).
57. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999).
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Under Virginia law the parole eligibility of a capital defendant
not sentenced to death depends on when he committed the crime
for which he was convicted. Defendants whose crimes were
committed on or after January 1, 1995 are ineligible for parole.58
Defendants whose crimes were committed before that date were
and are eligible for parole after twenty-five years,59 with two
limited exceptions. First, if the defendant had been previously
sentenced to life imprisonment, then the mandatory minimum term
under the life sentence imposed for the capital conviction would be
thirty years."' Second, if the capital murder conviction was the
defendant's third conviction-his third "strike--for either murder,
rape or robbery with a deadly weapon, then the defendant would be
ineligible for parole for life.6'
Based on a review of newspaper accounts and reported judicial
opinions, it appears that all but one of the defendants in our study
were eligible for parole under Virginia law. Four out of the six
defendants were eligible for parole after twenty-five years, and one
after thirty years. Moreover, because these defendants were eligible
for parole they would have been unable to secure an instruction
on parole ineligibility under Simmons. The remaining defendant
(Defendant 4) was ineligible for parole at the time of his original
trial and sentencing in 1993. However, the members of that
jury were not, given the law at the time, informed of that fact.
Defendant 4's sentence was reversed on appeal, and he was
resentenced in 1996. Due to intervening changes in the law, the
members of the resentencing jury, unlike those of the original jury,
were told that he would be ineligible for parole for life. Juror 1 for
Defendant 4 served on the original jury. Jurors 2 and 3 served on
the resentencing jury.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2002).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(C) (Michie 2002). But cf William C. Hood III, Note, The
Meaning of "Life for Virginia Jurors and its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75
VA. L. REV. 1605, 1605 & n.13 (1989) (noting that credit for good time could reduce this
period by three years and three months).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(D) (Michie 2002).
61. Id. § 53.1-151(B1). In some cases a defendant might accumulate all three strikes at
once based on the same course of conduct.
.2094 [Vol. 44:2063
20031 VIRGINIA'S CAPITAL JURORS 2095
With this background in place, Table 10 presents the responses
of each of our jurors to the question: "How long did you think
someone not given the death penalty for capital murder in this
state usually spends in prison?"
Table 10
Estimates of Release Time if
Not Sentenced to Death
(in years)
Juror Number
Defendant #1 #2 #3 Years in
Number prison before
being eligible
for parole
#1 10 15 50 30
#2 10 20 20-25 25
#3 13 25 life; 25
.no 
"wasn't sure
parole" if meant life"
#4 20 - life
#4 - life "not a factor; life
thought no parole
unless law
changed"
#5 25 "no idea" 25
#6 12-14 20 25
The results are generally consistent with prior CJP findings. 2
Of the fifteen jurors who responded, eight estimated that capital
62. See, e.g., Bowers & Steiner, supra note 7, at 647 & tbl.1 (reporting that thirty-six
Virginia jurors who served on capital cases tried between March 1989 and November 1991,
during which time capital defendants not sentenced to death were eligible for parole after
twenty-five years in prison, gave a median estimate release time of only sixteen years).
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defendants not sentenced to death are usually released from prison
well before the time the defendant in the case on which they sat
would even become eligible for release on parole. The estimations
of six jurors corresponded to, or exceeded, the actual time the
defendant in the case would remain in prison before becoming
eligible for parole. The remaining juror offered a range in response
to the question, with the low end underestimating the number of
years the defendant would be required to serve, and the top end
corresponding to it. The responses in the case of Defendant 4 also
display the potential influence of Simmons. The juror who did not
receive the instruction on parole ineligibility estimated that the
defendant would be released in twenty years, while the two jurors
who did receive the instruction correctly responded that the
defendant would remain in prison for life.
C. Sentencing Decisions
Third, prior CJP research strongly suggests that concerns
among jurors about a defendant's future dangerousness often
translate into a death sentence."3 For example, researchers using
data based on interviews with South Carolina jurors found that the
less time a juror believed the defendant would remain in prison
unless sentenced to death, the more likely the juror was to cast his
or her first vote for death.64 This association between a juror's
estimated release time and the juror's first vote at the penalty
phase remained statistically significant in regression models
that controlled for the most salient factors influencing a juror's
sentencing decision.6"
Although the small number of interviews we were able to
conduct prevents us from constructing similar regression models
for our Virginia jurors, we can at least report the responses jurors
63. See id. at 663-64; Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 7, at 300-03 tbl.6;
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 7.
64. See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 7, at 300-01 tbl.6.
65. See id. (estimate ofrelease time variable statistically significant at 0.01 level in model
controlling for other salient variables).
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gave when asked: "When you were considering punishment, were
you concerned that the defendant might get back into society
someday, if not given the death penalty?" Table 11 gives the
results.
Nine of the jurors who responded (64%) said they were "greatly
concerned," and another four (29%) said they were "somewhat
concerned." Only one juror said he or she was not at all concerned.
Moreover, the differences between the Virginia jtirors and South
Carolina jurors are quite striking. They are also statistically
significant (p = 0.028).66 While an analysis that held constant other
relevant variables would provide better evidence of a relationship
between ajuror's worries about a defendant's future dangerousness
and the juror's decision to vote for death, the results presented in
Table 11 are at least consistent with such a relationship. Indeed,
because future dangerousness is one of the two predicates for a
capital sentence expressly set forth in Virginia law, we would guess
66. These differences remain statistically significant at p = 0.091 when the p-value is
calculated using survey ordered logit regression. See supra note 19.
Table 11
When you were considering punishment, were
you concerned that the defendant might get back
into society someday, if not given the death
penalty?
Virginia South
(n = 14) Carolina
(n = 211)
Yes, greatly concerned 64% 37%
Yes, somewhat concerned 29% 31%
Yes, but only slightly 0% 13%
concerned
No, not at all concerned 7% 19%
Note -The significance level of the differences between the Virginia and
South Carolina jurors is p = 0.028 based on a Mann-Whitney test.
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that, if anything, the relationship is even stronger in Virginia than
in South Carolina.
In sum, capital jurors are generally worried about a defendant's
future dangerousness. Virginia jurors are no different. Indeed,
compared to South Carolina jurors, our Virginia jurors, are, if
anything, even more concerned. This difference may reflect the fact
that under Virginia law, both at the time our jurors served and
today, future dangerousness is often the focal point of the jury's
penalty phase deliberations. On the other hand, our jurors'
concerns might also reflect the fact that all but one of the
defendants in our study were eligible for parole if not sentenced to
death. Moreover, with only two exceptions, none of the jurors
received any instruction regarding the defendant's parole in-
eligibility. In contrast, under Virginia law today, no defendant
convicted of capital murder is eligible for parole, and all capital
jurors are informed of that fact. Whether these changes offset the
Virginia statute's continued focus on future dangerousness, and
thereby diminish the grip of future dangerousness on the minds of
Virginia capital jurors, remains an open question.
V. RESPONSIBILITY
A capital jury is responsible for the sentence it imposes, at least
insofar as the law gives its members the freedom to choose either
life or death. Moreover, under Caldwell v. Mississippi," capital
jurors cannot be misled into thinking that responsibility for the
defendant's sentence rests in anyone's hands but their own.6" So,
for example, if a prosecutor implies during closing arguments that
the jury should impose a death sentence because that sentence will,
if erroneous, be corrected on appeal, the defendant's sentence is
constitutionally invalid and must be reversed.69 Prior CJP research
67. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
68. See id. at 328-29; see also Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 111-12 (2002) (discussing Caldwell and its progeny).
69. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323.
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examining the allocation of responsibility in capital sentencing has
in general reached two conclusions worth discussing here.
First, when asked who, as between the jury, the judge, and the
appeals courts, bore responsibility for whether the defendant lived
or died, most jurors said they believed, as they should, that such
responsibility rests strictly or mostly with the jury.7° Nonetheless,
a substantial minority said they believed such responsibility was
only partly the jury's, and partly that of the judge and appeals
courts, or else mostly that of the judge and the appeals courts.7'
These latter two responses are, we believe, inconsistent with the
spirit, if not the letter, of Caldwell.
How do our Virginia jurors compare? Table 12 reports their
responses, along with those of South Carolina jurors.
Table 12
When you were considering the punishment, did you think that
whether the defendant lived or died was...
Virginia South
(n = 14) Carolina
(n = 208)
Strictly the jury's responsibility and no one else's 29% 31%
Mostly the jury's responsibility, but the judge or 36% 31%
appeals courts take over responsibility whenever
they overrule or change the jury's decision
Partly the jury's responsibility and partly the 29% 23%
responsibility of the judge and appeals courts who
review the jury's sentence
Mostly the responsibility of the judge and appeals 7% 15%
courts; we make the first decision but they make
the final decision
Note - The significance level of the differences between the Virginia and South Carolina jurors
is p = 0.870 based on a Mann-Whitney test.
70. See Bowers, supra note 7, at 1096 tbl. 11; Eisenberg et al., Responsibility, supra note
7, at 353 tbl.1.
71. See Bowers, supra note 7, at 1096 tbl.11; Eisenberg et al., Responsibility, supra note
7, at 353 tbl.1.
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Consistent with prior CJP findings, most of the Virginia jurors
(65%) assigned responsibility to the jury, either strictly or mostly,
as did a similar majority of the South Carolina jurors (62%). Still,
a substantial minority (36%) assigned responsibility for the
defendant's fate partly or mostly to the judge and appeals courts.
The same held true for the South Carolina jurors (38%). These
results suggest that more should be done to ensure that jurors do
not enter the penalty phase believing that responsibility for the
defendant's fate rests with anyone else but them. Simply
preventing prosecutors from encouraging jurors to abdicate
responsibility appears not to be enough. Instead, jurors should
clearly and unequivocally be instructed that they and they alone
are responsible for deciding what the defendant's punishment will
be.7
2
Second, prior CJP research also suggests that jurors tend to
believe that the defendant himself bears the greatest responsibility
for the punishment he ultimately receives. This result emerges
when the range of actors to whom responsibility can be assigned is
expanded to include the defendant himself, in addition to the
jurors, the judge, and the law. Table 13 gives the results for our
Virginia jurors, compared once again to South Carolina jurors.
72. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1157; see also Eisenberg et al., Responsibility, supra
note 7, at 379.
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The results for the Virginia jurors display the familiar pattern.
When asked to rank on a scale of one to five who or what is most to
least responsible for the defendant's punishment, most Virginia
jurors (55%) say the defendant ranks first, as do most South
Carolinajurors (51%). Capital jurors thus appear disinclined to see
the defendant as a victim of social circumstance. They tend to see
him instead as a responsible actor who chose to commit the crime
for which he has been convicted, and consequently, the lion's share
of responsibility for his ultimate punishment rests with him.73
None of the differences between the responses of the Virginia
jurors and the South Carolina jurors is statistically significant,
with one exception. Although jurors from both states agreed that
the defendant himself bears the greatest responsibility for his
punishment, they disagree on who bore the least responsibility.
South Carolina jurors tended to believe that the judge is least
responsible, whereas Virginia jurors tended to believe that they as
individuals were least responsible. Assuming that this difference
is real, it may be due in part to the fact that a majority or near
majority of the Virginia jurors believed that the law required them
to impose a death sentence if they believed the evidence proved the
crime's vileness or the defendant's future dangerousness. 74 Ifjurors
believe the law requires a death sentence when these facts exist,
then the law really decides the defendant's punishment,75 not the
jurors.
CONCLUSION
A defendant sentenced to death in Virginia, more so than a
defendant sentenced to death in another state, is likely to be
executed, and he is likely to be executed with exceptional dispatch.
According to conventional wisdom, the state and federal courts
hearing appeals from Virginia's death row are exceptionally unsym-
73. Cf. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 7, at 1567.
74. See supra tbls.7-8.
75. Forty-five percent of the Virginia jurors said that, after the defendant, the law was
most responsible for the defendant's punishment.
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pathetic to those appeals. The result is an appellate process that
affirms death sentences, and affirms them quickly.
Yet in contrast to its courts, Virginia's capital jurors appear,
based on our results, to behave much like their counterparts in
South Carolina and, we suspect, in most other states. Of course,
saying Virginia capital jurors behave like other capital jurors is not
to say they always behave as they should. On the contrary, Virginia
jurors, like jurors in South Carolina and elsewhere, often fail to
behave as the law expects them to behave, and considerable room
exists in Virginia, as it does in South Carolina and elsewhere, for
improvement in the process by which capital jurors are selected
and instructed.
In at least one respect, however, Virginia jurors may be
different. That difference relates to future dangerousness. Prior
research finds that worries about a defendant's future danger-
ousness play a critical role in a capital juror's decision to vote for
life or death. The limited evidence presented here suggests that
future dangerousness, at least among the jurors we interviewed,
may play an even greater role in the life and death decisions of
Virginia's capital jurors.
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